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Adapted from community forks (ardhiqii, kkunkunya, nihar-oracle, steimerbyte):
- Abort stalled /next long polls after 45s; time out, retry, and single-post results.
- Fall back to CDP Runtime.evaluate when chrome.scripting is refused (about:blank automation tabs).
- Load pi-chrome in same-process subagent sessions as a bridge client; client chrome_launch reports owner status.
- Add chrome_cdp (validated raw CDP passthrough, background-guarded, payload summarization) and chrome_cdp_targets.
- chrome_type reports before/after values, insertedAt, splice/unchanged warnings; add replace=true.
- includeSnapshot waits for navigations started by the action; tab.new reports the settled tab.
- CDP timeouts surface as timeouts and are not re-sent after the cleanup detach.
- Activate/deactivate chrome_find and chrome_inspect with the rest of the chrome_* tools.
- New unit suites: bridge-resilience, cdp-passthrough, type-evidence.
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Reverts the pairing + signed-envelopes work (0.16.0-0.16.1), the
standalone daemon refactor (0.17.0-0.17.3), and assorted patches.
These were unpublished from npm; this commit restores the working
tree to match the v0.15.20 release so the branch tip and the npm
'latest' dist-tag are consistent again.
Tags v0.16.0 through v0.17.3 are preserved as recovery anchors;
the work is reachable via 'git checkout v0.17.3' if ever needed.
Tree-equivalent to v0.15.20.
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Major security hardening of the Chrome bridge driven by red-team findings.
- Mandatory pairing via /chrome onboard (one-time per machine). Bridge pins exact
chrome-extension:// origin and derives HMAC keys via HKDF. Until paired, the
bridge returns idle responses and refuses to deliver commands.
- Signed envelopes on /next, /result, /command. HMAC-SHA256 over protocol version,
direction, method, path, extension ID, bridge ID, timestamp, fresh nonce, and
SHA-256 of the body. +/-30s clock window; 5-min LRU nonce replay defense on
both request and response directions; constant-time MAC compare.
- Peer Pi sessions sharing the bridge sign each /command with a broker HKDF key
(no bearer token transmitted) and verify the owner's signed response.
- Global loopback enforcement. PI_CHROME_BRIDGE_HOST=0.0.0.0 ignored unless
PI_CHROME_BRIDGE_DANGEROUS_REMOTE=1; loopback check still applies per-endpoint.
- Cross-process state coherence: fs.watch + per-request mtime check on
~/.config/pi/chrome-bridge.json. A peer Pi's unpair (or any external rm/edit)
propagates to the owner's in-memory state before the next privileged verify;
replay caches reset on key rotation.
- Body cap 1 MiB -> 413. Queue/pending/waiter caps. Malformed JSON -> 400.
Non-object JSON bodies -> 400 instead of being trusted.
- page.navigate initScript: try/finally around tabs.update, per-call onCommitted
listener with bounded commit-wait window, one-shot delete in global onCommitted.
No more stale init scripts firing on later unrelated navigations.
- crypto.randomUUID() command IDs.
- Manifest diet (dropped activeTab); added popup.html/popup.js for the pair UI.
UX:
- /chrome onboard runs install + pair in one interactive flow.
- /chrome help reorganized into First-time / Day-to-day / Maintenance.
- Status bar lights up as green dot only when authorized.
- Early console/network capture at document_start so boot-time React errors and
initial API calls aren't dropped (ported from DaniBedz/pi-chrome fork).
Docs:
- SECURITY.md threat model rewritten with in-scope / out-of-scope sections.
- README rewritten with the install-then-pair flow front and center.
- CHANGELOG 0.16.0 entry with full patch list.
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