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| author | Tianren Dong <tianrendong.dtr@gmail.com> | 2026-05-13 07:29:41 -0400 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Tianren Dong <tianrendong.dtr@gmail.com> | 2026-05-13 07:29:41 -0400 |
| commit | 4c54b05dc15b81e449dc8ac53da8bae536fa2798 (patch) | |
| tree | f81c5e627dcc4dd81d2fe2fd3b2b584e72a73eca /SECURITY.md | |
| parent | 5951b3fb04aaf53b875afe265a57a944d6fce641 (diff) | |
pi-chrome: snapshot pre-migration state
Diffstat (limited to 'SECURITY.md')
| -rw-r--r-- | SECURITY.md | 38 |
1 files changed, 38 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/SECURITY.md b/SECURITY.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..8627ca6 --- /dev/null +++ b/SECURITY.md @@ -0,0 +1,38 @@ +# Security policy + +## Reporting a vulnerability + +Open a GitHub issue prefixed with `[security]` at https://github.com/tianrendong/pi-packs/issues, or contact the maintainer directly if the issue is sensitive. Please do **not** include exploit details in a public issue without coordinating first. + +## Threat model + +`pi-chrome` is a developer tool you install knowingly. It is **not** designed to defend against: + +- Hostile pages running in your Chrome trying to detect or escape automation. (Standard browser security boundaries still apply, but a hostile page that already runs in your tab can do anything that page can already do.) +- Other processes on your local machine. The bridge binds to `127.0.0.1:17318` (loopback only) but **does not authenticate** local callers. Any process running as your user can issue commands. If your threat model includes hostile local processes, run pi-chrome on a separate user account. + +`pi-chrome` **is** designed to: + +- Never exfiltrate page state to the network. All communication is loopback (`127.0.0.1`). +- Surface every action with an honest result envelope so the agent can't silently do the wrong thing. +- Require explicit opt-in for trusted-input mode (`/chrome clicks on` or `trusted: true`), which uses `chrome.debugger` and shows Chrome's banner. + +## The companion extension + +The Chrome extension under `extensions/chrome-profile-bridge/browser-extension/` runs with broad permissions: `tabs`, `scripting`, `debugger`, `webNavigation`, etc. **Only install it from a package source you trust.** Read the source before loading. Pin a known-good commit if you're security-sensitive. + +## Defaults + +- Loopback bridge only. No remote port. No telemetry. +- Synthetic events first; trusted CDP only when explicitly enabled. +- Quiet mode optional; tab/window focus is observable (the user can see Pi acting). + +## Override the port + +```bash +PI_CHROME_BRIDGE_PORT=17319 pi +``` + +## Supported versions + +The latest minor on npm is supported. Security patches will be released as soon as practical. |