0.15.29: CSP bypass via CDP Runtime.evaluate for evaluate/snapshot/waitFor/initScript

- evaluateInTab/executeInTab now run through CDP Runtime.evaluate instead of
  new Function() in MAIN world, so chrome_evaluate/chrome_snapshot work on pages
  that block unsafe-eval (github.com, many bank/SaaS apps). Preserves value
  markers (undefined/function/symbol/bigint/Error), DOMRect expansion, and the
  expression/statement fallback; keeps {ok,value} error envelope.
- page.waitFor polls via service-worker-side CDP evaluation.
- chrome_navigate initScript uses Page.addScriptToEvaluateOnNewDocument.
- Add npm test (test-suite/unit/csp-eval.test.mjs) and in-browser regression
  challenge 42 strict-csp-evaluate; update challenge 39 notes + docs/primer.

1 files changed, 1 insertions, 1 deletions

diff --git a/docs/FAQ.md b/docs/FAQ.md
index f821da7..3893575 100644
--- a/docs/FAQ.md
+++ b/docs/FAQ.md
@@ -55,7 +55,7 @@ pi-chrome controls web pages through Chrome extension APIs, page inspection, scr
 
 ## Does `chrome_evaluate` work on strict-CSP pages?
 
-Not always. `chrome_evaluate` and `chrome_snapshot` run in the page's MAIN world through the Function constructor, so pages whose CSP blocks `'unsafe-eval'` can reject them. `chrome_screenshot`, `chrome_navigate`, tab tools, and real Chrome input still work because they use extension/browser APIs rather than page JavaScript.
+Yes. `chrome_evaluate` and `chrome_snapshot` run in the page's MAIN world through CDP `Runtime.evaluate`, which is a DevTools protocol command and is **not** subject to the page's Content-Security-Policy. They work even on pages that block `'unsafe-eval'` (e.g. github.com and many bank/SaaS apps). `chrome_navigate`'s `initScript` injects at document_start via CDP and likewise bypasses CSP. `chrome_screenshot`, tab tools, and real Chrome input also keep working under any CSP.
 
 ## How do I tell whether a click or type worked?