0.15.29: CSP bypass via CDP Runtime.evaluate for evaluate/snapshot/waitFor/initScript

- evaluateInTab/executeInTab now run through CDP Runtime.evaluate instead of
  new Function() in MAIN world, so chrome_evaluate/chrome_snapshot work on pages
  that block unsafe-eval (github.com, many bank/SaaS apps). Preserves value
  markers (undefined/function/symbol/bigint/Error), DOMRect expansion, and the
  expression/statement fallback; keeps {ok,value} error envelope.
- page.waitFor polls via service-worker-side CDP evaluation.
- chrome_navigate initScript uses Page.addScriptToEvaluateOnNewDocument.
- Add npm test (test-suite/unit/csp-eval.test.mjs) and in-browser regression
  challenge 42 strict-csp-evaluate; update challenge 39 notes + docs/primer.

3 files changed, 3 insertions, 3 deletions

diff --git a/docs/COMPARISON.md b/docs/COMPARISON.md
index 3f8db12..16cd81a 100644
--- a/docs/COMPARISON.md
+++ b/docs/COMPARISON.md
@@ -134,7 +134,7 @@ If your threat model excludes extensions with broad permissions, neither approac
 
 ## Public benchmarks worth knowing (for axis 2 / axis 3 comparison)
 
-Pi-chrome itself ships a benchmark suite ([`../test-suite/`](../test-suite)) of **41 primitive challenges** plus **4 hermetic BrowserGym-style long-horizon tasks** covering trusted input, pointer humanization, keyboard fidelity, drag/drop, Shadow DOM, iframes, file uploads, strict-CSP screenshot fallback, dynamic waits, tab lifecycle, network observability, fingerprint leaks, and agent-safety honeypots. Scoring tracks expected outcomes per challenge instead of raw PASS count, with `core`, `conditional`, and `quality` gate buckets. That's **driver-level** grading.
+Pi-chrome itself ships a benchmark suite ([`../test-suite/`](../test-suite)) of **42 primitive challenges** plus **4 hermetic BrowserGym-style long-horizon tasks** covering trusted input, pointer humanization, keyboard fidelity, drag/drop, Shadow DOM, iframes, file uploads, strict-CSP screenshot fallback and CDP eval/snapshot bypass, dynamic waits, tab lifecycle, network observability, fingerprint leaks, and agent-safety honeypots. Scoring tracks expected outcomes per challenge instead of raw PASS count, with `core`, `conditional`, and `quality` gate buckets. That's **driver-level** grading.
 
 For **agent-level** comparison (axis 2), the public benchmarks worth citing:
 
diff --git a/docs/EXAMPLES.md b/docs/EXAMPLES.md
index bf3aa0a..434d0f8 100644
--- a/docs/EXAMPLES.md
+++ b/docs/EXAMPLES.md
@@ -161,6 +161,6 @@ Interactive tools use Chrome's real input layer by default: clicks, typing, fill
 - fullscreen and other user-activation checks
 - pages where DOM injection/evaluate is limited, if the agent can use screenshots + coordinates
 
-Strict CSP note: `chrome_snapshot`/`chrome_evaluate` may be blocked on pages that disallow `unsafe-eval`; `chrome_screenshot`, tab/navigation tools, and real input still work.
+Strict CSP note: `chrome_snapshot`/`chrome_evaluate` work even on pages that disallow `unsafe-eval`, because they run via CDP `Runtime.evaluate` (not page-level `eval`/`new Function`), which is not subject to page CSP. `chrome_screenshot`, tab/navigation tools, and real input also work under any CSP.
 
 Chrome may show its debugger banner while pi-chrome is attached.
diff --git a/docs/FAQ.md b/docs/FAQ.md
index f821da7..3893575 100644
--- a/docs/FAQ.md
+++ b/docs/FAQ.md
@@ -55,7 +55,7 @@ pi-chrome controls web pages through Chrome extension APIs, page inspection, scr
 
 ## Does `chrome_evaluate` work on strict-CSP pages?
 
-Not always. `chrome_evaluate` and `chrome_snapshot` run in the page's MAIN world through the Function constructor, so pages whose CSP blocks `'unsafe-eval'` can reject them. `chrome_screenshot`, `chrome_navigate`, tab tools, and real Chrome input still work because they use extension/browser APIs rather than page JavaScript.
+Yes. `chrome_evaluate` and `chrome_snapshot` run in the page's MAIN world through CDP `Runtime.evaluate`, which is a DevTools protocol command and is **not** subject to the page's Content-Security-Policy. They work even on pages that block `'unsafe-eval'` (e.g. github.com and many bank/SaaS apps). `chrome_navigate`'s `initScript` injects at document_start via CDP and likewise bypasses CSP. `chrome_screenshot`, tab tools, and real Chrome input also keep working under any CSP.
 
 ## How do I tell whether a click or type worked?