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The grant lives on globalThis so /reload keeps it, but nothing cleared it
when pi replaced the session in the same process. After /new, /resume or
/fork the next session started authorized and announced it in the footer.
Drop the saved grant on session_shutdown for new, resume and fork. Reload
keeps it. Quit leaves it alone, so a subagent quitting in the same process
does not take its parent's grant with it.
grant-scope.test.mjs loads the shipped module once per runtime in one
shared context, the way pi keeps globalThis across reloads and switches,
and checks the tools and the footer after each. It fails on 85b4988, and
its /chrome authorize cases fail with only the PI_CHROME_AUTHORIZE fix.
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page.upload and a raw DOM.setFileInputFiles through cdp.call now have to name
files whose real path is under /tmp/pi-chrome-uploads (PI_CHROME_UPLOAD_DIR),
on the broker's host. Anyone holding the token could otherwise attach any file
the user can read to a page.
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- Contribute the primer as a structured prompt section instead of forcing systemPrompt.
- Log pi-chrome-tool-change as a rendered custom entry that is not sent to the model.
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to Pi tabs
Fixes #9. Sites like BOSS Zhipin log an object with a getter/toString trap and
close the tab if it is read. Store captured console args raw and serialize them
on read without running page code (data properties only, accessors as [getter],
built-ins via native getters). Inject document-start capture only into Pi's
automation tab and session-tracked tabs.
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screenshots; release 0.15.54
- Check page visibility before trusted input: Chrome drops input to hidden pages (inactive tabs,
covered/minimized windows, macOS window tabs behind full screen). Type/key/hover/scroll/tap/drag
fail fast with the reason; click/fill use their DOM fallback immediately (or reject with
domFallback:false).
- Use an inactive tab instead of a new window for the automation target while the user's window is
full screen.
- chrome_type with uid/selector moves the caret to the end (moveToEndOfDocument) after its focus click.
- chrome_upload_file: labels/wrappers resolve to their file input, same-origin iframe search, and
intercepted file chooser for upload buttons (trusted click when visible, user-gesture click when
hidden); reject multiple paths for single-file inputs; no duplicate change event.
- Prune default-folder chrome_screenshot captures (7 days, newest 20 kept, retentionDays override).
- input.debug without a target no longer calls tabs.get(-1).
- New hidden-input unit suite.
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Adapted from community forks (ardhiqii, kkunkunya, nihar-oracle, steimerbyte):
- Abort stalled /next long polls after 45s; time out, retry, and single-post results.
- Fall back to CDP Runtime.evaluate when chrome.scripting is refused (about:blank automation tabs).
- Load pi-chrome in same-process subagent sessions as a bridge client; client chrome_launch reports owner status.
- Add chrome_cdp (validated raw CDP passthrough, background-guarded, payload summarization) and chrome_cdp_targets.
- chrome_type reports before/after values, insertedAt, splice/unchanged warnings; add replace=true.
- includeSnapshot waits for navigations started by the action; tab.new reports the settled tab.
- CDP timeouts surface as timeouts and are not re-sent after the cleanup detach.
- Activate/deactivate chrome_find and chrome_inspect with the rest of the chrome_* tools.
- New unit suites: bridge-resilience, cdp-passthrough, type-evidence.
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Stop pi-chrome from hijacking the user's active tab. Page/navigation actions
with no explicit target now route to a dedicated automation window owned by the
calling Pi session (falling back to a dedicated tab if a window can't be made),
instead of overwriting whatever the user has open.
- Session-scoped ownership: Map<sessionKey, target> in the service worker, keyed
by a sessionKey forwarded from index.ts, so concurrent sessions (one shared
extension) never fight over a window or close each other's tabs.
- Persistence: ownership mirrored to chrome.storage.session so a service-worker
restart re-hydrates and reuses the window instead of orphaning it. Cleared on
full browser restart; restored windows are then left alone (never reclaimed).
- getTabByParams default branch resolves the owned target; tab.activate/close/
group/ungroup pass createOwnedTarget:false so management never auto-creates a
throwaway tab or falls back to the user's active tab.
- Session-group integration: the dedicated-window tab still joins this session's
tab group, in its own window; grouping stays best-effort.
- Lifecycle: cleanup on /chrome revoke and real session end (not /reload);
fire-and-forget so it never blocks /quit, /reload, or shutdown.
- Tests: new test-suite/unit/automation-target.test.mjs (isolation, reuse,
concurrency, restart/reconnect re-hydration, guarded tab.*, group integration,
window->tab fallback, robust cleanup). Docs + CHANGELOG updated.
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- chrome_snapshot returns a concise observation (layout, hints, actions, forms,
page map, query matches, diff) with mode/query/maxTextChars params
- new chrome_find (query -> ranked uids) and chrome_inspect (deep element context,
with page.inspect fallback)
- includeSnapshot on click/type/fill/key now embeds the formatted snapshot
- snapshot/inspect logic shipped as eval-free packaged snapshot_injected.js,
sharing window.__PI_CHROME_STATE__ (el- uid scheme) with existing input helpers
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chrome_* tools on session_start)
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chrome_type/chrome_key (US-layout keymap)
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merge by title
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evaluate/snapshot/waitFor/initScript
- evaluateInTab/executeInTab now run through CDP Runtime.evaluate instead of
new Function() in MAIN world, so chrome_evaluate/chrome_snapshot work on pages
that block unsafe-eval (github.com, many bank/SaaS apps). Preserves value
markers (undefined/function/symbol/bigint/Error), DOMRect expansion, and the
expression/statement fallback; keeps {ok,value} error envelope.
- page.waitFor polls via service-worker-side CDP evaluation.
- chrome_navigate initScript uses Page.addScriptToEvaluateOnNewDocument.
- Add npm test (test-suite/unit/csp-eval.test.mjs) and in-browser regression
challenge 42 strict-csp-evaluate; update challenge 39 notes + docs/primer.
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DOMRect serialization, stale-target errors, pageMutated wording
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Tree-equivalent to v0.15.20 (preceded by the revert commit). Bumping
to 0.15.21 sets the package up for normal patch releases on the 0.15.x
line going forward — no version-number collisions with the unpublished
0.16/0.17 work.
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Reverts the pairing + signed-envelopes work (0.16.0-0.16.1), the
standalone daemon refactor (0.17.0-0.17.3), and assorted patches.
These were unpublished from npm; this commit restores the working
tree to match the v0.15.20 release so the branch tip and the npm
'latest' dist-tag are consistent again.
Tags v0.16.0 through v0.17.3 are preserved as recovery anchors;
the work is reachable via 'git checkout v0.17.3' if ever needed.
Tree-equivalent to v0.15.20.
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In 0.17.x the daemon is a separate process that can idle-shut-down
(10 min idle) or be killed externally while Pi sessions are running.
Without self-heal, the next /chrome onboard or chrome_* call surfaces
'fetch failed' instead of recovering.
bridge.admin() now catches the failed fetch, re-runs ensureDaemonRunning
(probe -> spawn if missing), and retries once.
bridge.sendViaOwner() pre-probes /status and spawns the daemon if missing
before issuing the signed /command.
Net effect: a missing daemon transparently respawns instead of bubbling
fetch failed up to the user.
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Bugs surfaced in real-world 0.17.0/0.17.1 testing:
1. Daemon /next only recorded lastSeenAt AFTER the auth/pair checks. Pre-pair
the daemon returns needsPairing early without recording the poll, so
connected stayed false even though the extension was polling. /chrome
onboard's wait-for-poll loop spun forever on a healthy extension.
Fix: record lastSeenAt at the top of /next for any chrome-extension
origin, before auth checks. Onboard now correctly detects 'extension
alive but unpaired' which is the precise state during pair step.
2. Daemon compatibility was checked at major.minor match. Result: a patch
release fixing a daemon bug (like #1) couldn't replace the running
daemon — new Pi client joins old buggy daemon as client.
Fix: exact version match. Patch releases auto-kill+respawn the daemon.
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0.17.0 made the daemon own the HTTP listener, but the Pi client's
bridge.status().connected still reflected the local Pi's lastSeenAt
(which is never updated in the daemon model). Onboard's connect-wait
loop spun forever even when the extension was polling the daemon.
Fix: new ChromeProfileBridge.daemonStatus() async helper that fetches
the daemon's /status. onboard, doctor, and status now query that for
the 'connected' flag instead of reading stale Pi-side state.
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The Chrome bridge is now a separate detached daemon at
~/.cache/pi-chrome/<version>/daemon.cjs. Every Pi session is a uniform client;
daemon lifecycle is decoupled from any Pi session. Killing a Pi never breaks
Chrome control, and pi update followed by any new Pi session auto-replaces
an incompatible daemon.
Architecture:
- New extensions/chrome-profile-bridge/daemon.cjs: ~700 LOC, zero deps, runs
detached. Owns the HTTP listener, BridgeAuth state, command queue, /pair
handshake. Idle-shuts-down after 10 min of no activity.
- ChromeProfileBridge on Pi side becomes a pure client: start() probes /status,
spawns daemon if missing/incompatible, kills+respawns if version mismatch.
send() always uses signed /command. No more server-mode branch.
- New signed /admin RPC for pair-window/reset/status state mutations the
daemon owns. Pi clients sign with broker key (same contract as /command).
- New /heartbeat for daemon idle-timer keepalive.
- daemon.log at ~/.cache/pi-chrome/<version>/daemon.log.
/chrome pair, /chrome unpair, /chrome onboard now go through /admin RPCs
instead of mutating in-process bridge state.
Removed the foreign-owner takeover dance from /chrome onboard (auto-handled
at session_start now).
Wire protocol is byte-identical to 0.16.x; existing paired extensions don't
need to re-pair. See docs/DESIGN-0.17-daemon.md for the full write-up.
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User pain: machines stuck in broken state after pi-chrome upgrades because an old
pi-chrome process kept holding :17318 and /chrome onboard trusted confirm() clicks
without verifying anything. Both fixed.
Idempotent /chrome onboard recovery flow:
- Always resets Pi-side pairing state first (kills half-paired ghosts).
- Step 1 covers both first-install AND v0.15->v0.16 reload (extension service worker
must reload to gain the /pair logic).
- Actively verifies progress at each step rather than trusting clicks:
- polls bridge.status().connected (15s window) to confirm the extension polls /next,
- polls bridge.bridgeAuth.paired to confirm the /pair handshake completed,
- round-trips a real tab.version command to confirm the signed-envelope path works.
- /chrome install is now an alias of /chrome onboard.
Automatic stale-owner takeover at bridge.start():
- /status now includes bridgeVersion.
- On EADDRINUSE, probe /status with 1s timeout. If unresponsive OR major.minor
mismatches, locate the owner PID via lsof and kill it (SIGTERM -> SIGKILL),
then re-bind. Same-version owners are joined as clients (multi-Pi sharing).
- Eliminates the 'stale Pi session holding bridge' class of bugs that broke
upgrades from 0.15.x.
/chrome status / doctor / onboard no longer hang:
- New probeExtension() short-circuits before bridge.send when the bridge can't
round-trip (unpaired, or extension hasn't polled recently). Returns immediately
with an actionable message instead of waiting 5-35s.
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Major security hardening of the Chrome bridge driven by red-team findings.
- Mandatory pairing via /chrome onboard (one-time per machine). Bridge pins exact
chrome-extension:// origin and derives HMAC keys via HKDF. Until paired, the
bridge returns idle responses and refuses to deliver commands.
- Signed envelopes on /next, /result, /command. HMAC-SHA256 over protocol version,
direction, method, path, extension ID, bridge ID, timestamp, fresh nonce, and
SHA-256 of the body. +/-30s clock window; 5-min LRU nonce replay defense on
both request and response directions; constant-time MAC compare.
- Peer Pi sessions sharing the bridge sign each /command with a broker HKDF key
(no bearer token transmitted) and verify the owner's signed response.
- Global loopback enforcement. PI_CHROME_BRIDGE_HOST=0.0.0.0 ignored unless
PI_CHROME_BRIDGE_DANGEROUS_REMOTE=1; loopback check still applies per-endpoint.
- Cross-process state coherence: fs.watch + per-request mtime check on
~/.config/pi/chrome-bridge.json. A peer Pi's unpair (or any external rm/edit)
propagates to the owner's in-memory state before the next privileged verify;
replay caches reset on key rotation.
- Body cap 1 MiB -> 413. Queue/pending/waiter caps. Malformed JSON -> 400.
Non-object JSON bodies -> 400 instead of being trusted.
- page.navigate initScript: try/finally around tabs.update, per-call onCommitted
listener with bounded commit-wait window, one-shot delete in global onCommitted.
No more stale init scripts firing on later unrelated navigations.
- crypto.randomUUID() command IDs.
- Manifest diet (dropped activeTab); added popup.html/popup.js for the pair UI.
UX:
- /chrome onboard runs install + pair in one interactive flow.
- /chrome help reorganized into First-time / Day-to-day / Maintenance.
- Status bar lights up as green dot only when authorized.
- Early console/network capture at document_start so boot-time React errors and
initial API calls aren't dropped (ported from DaniBedz/pi-chrome fork).
Docs:
- SECURITY.md threat model rewritten with in-scope / out-of-scope sections.
- README rewritten with the install-then-pair flow front and center.
- CHANGELOG 0.16.0 entry with full patch list.
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Thread the harness AbortSignal through authorizedBridgeSend, the
ChromeProfileBridge send/sendLocal/sendViaOwner paths, and every
chrome_* tool's execute(). Pressing Esc now rejects the in-flight
bridge call immediately (most visibly fixing chrome_wait_for, which
would otherwise block for the full timeoutMs).
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