| Age | Commit message (Collapse) | Author |
|
A window shows only one tab, so sessions sharing one hid each other's tabs: no
real input and blank screenshots for every session but the one whose tab was
active (castle-pirc-web, 2026-11-08). Time-sharing the active tab would flip tabs
under the user while they sign in for an agent, so revert 66fbd30: a session
gets its own unfocused window. Kept: chrome_tab new for a session with no window
opens one for it instead of landing in the user's focused window. The primer
and chrome_tab description now say why to reuse a tab.
|
|
Diagnostics on 1Password's inline prompt: the page holds a <com-1password-uso>
element and no iframe in its own DOM; the frame is inside a closed shadow root.
Run in the isolated world, where chrome.dom.openOrClosedShadowRoot can read it,
and remove the element that hosts a foreign extension frame. Drop the body-click
events: they were never shown to help.
|
|
what it saw
The password manager's frame target can come without a tabId, so it was missed
(error said 'unknown', remaining targets empty). Match by the ?tabId= in the
frame URL too, and when the tab stays blocked report every foreign target and
what the injected script saw, so the next step is based on data.
|
|
The isolated-world body events did not free a 1Password-blocked tab; the DOM
click fallback (MAIN world, full pointer event shape, el.click()) did. Use that
shape, aimed at the page root so no control is clicked.
|
|
Measured on 1Password's inline menu: blur and Escape did not free the tab, a
click outside did. overlay.clear now also sends pointer/mouse events to the
body and polls the debugger for about a second instead of checking once.
|
|
The error, the tool description and the primer no longer tell the agent to ask
the user first. It clears the prompt when it is only in the way, and leaves it
alone and says so when it is waiting for the user to sign in or approve.
|
|
chrome_clear_overlay closes it on request
Another extension's frame (1Password's inline prompt) makes Chrome refuse the
debugger on the tab. The old path sent Escape on its own, which cannot reach
that frame and would close a prompt the user may be using. Now nothing is closed
automatically: the error says what is blocking and tells the agent to ask the
user; chrome_clear_overlay removes the frame, blurs the field, sends Escape and
reports whether the tab is usable again.
|
|
Attaching first (for the Leave-site prompt) made chrome_navigate fail on a tab
whose page holds another extension's frame, such as a 1Password inline prompt,
which is exactly when navigating away is the way out. Attach is now best effort.
|
|
A session's first tab used chrome.windows.create, so every new session name (and
every Claude Code process) got its own window. It now goes into the window that
already holds any 'Pi Session:' group; a window is created only when none exists.
chrome_tab new for a session with no group also uses that window, not the user's
focused one. The primer and the chrome_tab description say so.
|
|
A page with a beforeunload handler shows 'Leave site?' when the extension
navigates away. Nothing answered it, so chrome_navigate waited out its timeout
and the agent never learned why. The worker now hears Page.javascriptDialogOpening
and dismisses the dialog (stay/cancel); page.navigate fails at once and says so.
leaveIfAsked: true, for that call only, accepts a beforeunload prompt. Tool
description and primer tell agents when to use it and to ask the user when unsure.
|
|
|
|
0.15.54 opened Pi's automation target as a tab in the user's window while it
was full screen, assuming macOS would merge a new window into it as a hidden
window tab. Chrome disables automatic window tabbing (app_controller_mac.mm),
so that never happens; the hidden tabs came from the tab-group bug fixed in
0.15.56. Always prefer Pi's own window.
|
|
Chrome ignores clicks and typing in hidden pages. Doctor now asks the worker
whether this session's own tab is visible (automation.status includeVisibility,
which never creates or activates a tab) and reports the reason and fix when it
is hidden.
|
|
storage.session is wiped when the extension reloads, which it does on every
pi-chrome update, so Pi lost track of its automation window and session tabs
and left them behind. Mirror ownership to storage.local, restore it only when
the session copy is missing, re-check every restored tab (same window; adopted
tabs still in Pi's group), and drop the local copy on browser startup.
|
|
chrome.tabs.group without createProperties.windowId creates the group in the
current (user's) window and moves the tab there, so a session's automation tab
left its dedicated window and became a hidden inactive tab. Make the unit mock
match Chrome's behavior.
|
|
|
|
chrome_fill's triple-click selected one line of a multi-line textarea, so fill
replaced only that line. Select value fields with the selectAll editing command
before deleting. Early capture now waits for in-flight tab.new creations, so a
first page that commits before the tab is tracked is still captured.
|
|
|
|
to Pi tabs
Fixes #9. Sites like BOSS Zhipin log an object with a getter/toString trap and
close the tab if it is read. Store captured console args raw and serialize them
on read without running page code (data properties only, accessors as [getter],
built-ins via native getters). Inject document-start capture only into Pi's
automation tab and session-tracked tabs.
|
|
screenshots; release 0.15.54
- Check page visibility before trusted input: Chrome drops input to hidden pages (inactive tabs,
covered/minimized windows, macOS window tabs behind full screen). Type/key/hover/scroll/tap/drag
fail fast with the reason; click/fill use their DOM fallback immediately (or reject with
domFallback:false).
- Use an inactive tab instead of a new window for the automation target while the user's window is
full screen.
- chrome_type with uid/selector moves the caret to the end (moveToEndOfDocument) after its focus click.
- chrome_upload_file: labels/wrappers resolve to their file input, same-origin iframe search, and
intercepted file chooser for upload buttons (trusted click when visible, user-gesture click when
hidden); reject multiple paths for single-file inputs; no duplicate change event.
- Prune default-folder chrome_screenshot captures (7 days, newest 20 kept, retentionDays override).
- input.debug without a target no longer calls tabs.get(-1).
- New hidden-input unit suite.
|
|
Adapted from community forks (ardhiqii, kkunkunya, nihar-oracle, steimerbyte):
- Abort stalled /next long polls after 45s; time out, retry, and single-post results.
- Fall back to CDP Runtime.evaluate when chrome.scripting is refused (about:blank automation tabs).
- Load pi-chrome in same-process subagent sessions as a bridge client; client chrome_launch reports owner status.
- Add chrome_cdp (validated raw CDP passthrough, background-guarded, payload summarization) and chrome_cdp_targets.
- chrome_type reports before/after values, insertedAt, splice/unchanged warnings; add replace=true.
- includeSnapshot waits for navigations started by the action; tab.new reports the settled tab.
- CDP timeouts surface as timeouts and are not re-sent after the cleanup detach.
- Activate/deactivate chrome_find and chrome_inspect with the rest of the chrome_* tools.
- New unit suites: bridge-resilience, cdp-passthrough, type-evidence.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Stop pi-chrome from hijacking the user's active tab. Page/navigation actions
with no explicit target now route to a dedicated automation window owned by the
calling Pi session (falling back to a dedicated tab if a window can't be made),
instead of overwriting whatever the user has open.
- Session-scoped ownership: Map<sessionKey, target> in the service worker, keyed
by a sessionKey forwarded from index.ts, so concurrent sessions (one shared
extension) never fight over a window or close each other's tabs.
- Persistence: ownership mirrored to chrome.storage.session so a service-worker
restart re-hydrates and reuses the window instead of orphaning it. Cleared on
full browser restart; restored windows are then left alone (never reclaimed).
- getTabByParams default branch resolves the owned target; tab.activate/close/
group/ungroup pass createOwnedTarget:false so management never auto-creates a
throwaway tab or falls back to the user's active tab.
- Session-group integration: the dedicated-window tab still joins this session's
tab group, in its own window; grouping stays best-effort.
- Lifecycle: cleanup on /chrome revoke and real session end (not /reload);
fire-and-forget so it never blocks /quit, /reload, or shutdown.
- Tests: new test-suite/unit/automation-target.test.mjs (isolation, reuse,
concurrency, restart/reconnect re-hydration, guarded tab.*, group integration,
window->tab fallback, robust cleanup). Docs + CHANGELOG updated.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
- chrome_snapshot returns a concise observation (layout, hints, actions, forms,
page map, query matches, diff) with mode/query/maxTextChars params
- new chrome_find (query -> ranked uids) and chrome_inspect (deep element context,
with page.inspect fallback)
- includeSnapshot on click/type/fill/key now embeds the formatted snapshot
- snapshot/inspect logic shipped as eval-free packaged snapshot_injected.js,
sharing window.__PI_CHROME_STATE__ (el- uid scheme) with existing input helpers
|
|
chrome_* tools on session_start)
|
|
chrome_type/chrome_key (US-layout keymap)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
merge by title
|
|
evaluate/snapshot/waitFor/initScript
- evaluateInTab/executeInTab now run through CDP Runtime.evaluate instead of
new Function() in MAIN world, so chrome_evaluate/chrome_snapshot work on pages
that block unsafe-eval (github.com, many bank/SaaS apps). Preserves value
markers (undefined/function/symbol/bigint/Error), DOMRect expansion, and the
expression/statement fallback; keeps {ok,value} error envelope.
- page.waitFor polls via service-worker-side CDP evaluation.
- chrome_navigate initScript uses Page.addScriptToEvaluateOnNewDocument.
- Add npm test (test-suite/unit/csp-eval.test.mjs) and in-browser regression
challenge 42 strict-csp-evaluate; update challenge 39 notes + docs/primer.
|
|
DOMRect serialization, stale-target errors, pageMutated wording
|
|
|
|
|
|
|