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/**
* Opening a browser window for a chosen profile.
*
* CDP cannot do this: `Target.createTarget` rejects another profile's
* browserContextId ("Failed to find browser context with id"), and a bare
* createTarget lands in `defaultBrowserContextId`, which follows window focus.
* The only way in is the browser's own command line — Chromium's
* ProcessSingleton hands a second launch's argv to the running browser, which
* "does what it would have done", i.e. opens a window in `--profile-directory`.
*
* The window is then identified by a unique `file://` sentinel page. That
* matters: a bare `about:blank#token` argument is discarded by Chrome (it opens
* chrome://newtab instead), so the token has to ride on a real URL. Polling for
* the sentinel URL — rather than diffing the target list — also keeps
* identification correct when the user opens tabs at the same moment.
*/
import { spawn } from "node:child_process";
import { randomUUID } from "node:crypto";
import { rm, writeFile } from "node:fs/promises";
import { tmpdir } from "node:os";
import { join } from "node:path";
import { pathToFileURL } from "node:url";
import { type Result, err, ok } from "../util/result";
export type ProfileWindowRequest = {
/** Browser binary to invoke. */
readonly exePath: string;
/** Profile subdirectory, e.g. "Profile 1". */
readonly profileDir: string;
/**
* Only set when the RUNNING browser was launched with an explicit
* --user-data-dir. ProcessSingleton keys on this path, so passing one that
* differs by case or normalisation would start a second browser instead of
* delegating to the running one.
*/
readonly explicitUserDataDir?: string;
};
export type ProfileWindowHandle = {
/** file:// URL that will appear as the new window's page target. */
readonly sentinelUrl: string;
/** Remove the sentinel file. Safe to call more than once. */
readonly cleanup: () => Promise<void>;
};
const SENTINEL_HTML = (token: string): string =>
`<!doctype html><meta charset="utf-8"><title>${token}</title>` +
`<body style="font:14px system-ui;padding:2rem;color:#555">pi browser harness — opening this profile…</body>`;
/**
* Ask the running browser to open a window in `profileDir`, marked with a
* unique sentinel page the caller can then find over CDP.
*/
export const openProfileWindow = async (
req: ProfileWindowRequest,
): Promise<Result<ProfileWindowHandle, string>> => {
const token = `pi-harness-${randomUUID()}`;
const file = join(tmpdir(), `${token}.html`);
try {
await writeFile(file, SENTINEL_HTML(token), "utf8");
} catch (e) {
return err(`could not write the profile handshake page: ${e instanceof Error ? e.message : String(e)}`);
}
const sentinelUrl = pathToFileURL(file).href;
const args: string[] = [];
if (req.explicitUserDataDir) args.push(`--user-data-dir=${req.explicitUserDataDir}`);
args.push(`--profile-directory=${req.profileDir}`, "--new-window", sentinelUrl);
try {
// No shell: arguments are passed as an array, so profile names and paths
// containing spaces survive intact on every platform.
const child = spawn(req.exePath, args, { detached: true, stdio: "ignore" });
child.unref();
// The launcher process exits as soon as the running browser takes over the
// command line; an error here means the binary itself could not be started.
child.on("error", () => {});
} catch (e) {
await rm(file, { force: true }).catch(() => {});
return err(`could not launch ${req.exePath}: ${e instanceof Error ? e.message : String(e)}`);
}
return ok({
sentinelUrl,
cleanup: async () => {
await rm(file, { force: true }).catch(() => {});
},
});
};
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