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authorIgor Soarez <igor@soarez.org>2026-09-25 03:09:35 +0300
committerIgor Soarez <igor@soarez.org>2026-09-25 03:09:35 +0300
commit96c42e431c8252f02556aba9d9f7373dcdf92e41 (patch)
tree304aa362841ae044df6261c4fe3dea4fed0744b8 /secrets
parentb9e58b099d2c9fca930f94f54fbfef0675a17974 (diff)
dot-request: file a change request from a machine that cannot push
A clone made over https cannot publish anything, so a fix found on such a machine is lost at the next pull. The instructions already said to hand back a change request instead of editing; this is the command that does it. The request is markdown on stdin, signed with a key that machine holds, and posted to the inbox, which stores it only if the signature is from a key authorised there. Where the key is not authorised, nothing is stored and the submission says so. The endpoint is named here, which the leak rule would otherwise forbid, and the rule now carries the exception: a public endpoint this repo's own tooling must reach, already published by a DNS record and a certificate in the transparency logs, is not a leak. Concealing it would protect nothing and cost every machine a hand-written config file; what protects it is the signature. The private layer's check has the same exception, so it is enforced rather than remembered, and it does not extend to hosts, addresses or internal-only names. The other side is documented too: where `sz-requests` exists, what arrived can be read and judged. A signature says which machine produced the text, never that the text is right -- the machines filing these are the ones this account does not fully control.
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