pi-chrome, patched to drive a signed-in browser on another host through a broker, with an MCP server https://git.soarez.net/sz/sz-chrome-remote-extension.git/atom?h=master 2026-05-16T17:13:48+00:00 2026-05-16T17:13:48+00:00 Tianren Dong tianrendong.dtr@gmail.com 2026-05-16T17:13:32+00:00 urn:sha1:b2ca8f8c343281c0263bda4c043cbe7f0d7d442e Reverts the pairing + signed-envelopes work (0.16.0-0.16.1), the standalone daemon refactor (0.17.0-0.17.3), and assorted patches. These were unpublished from npm; this commit restores the working tree to match the v0.15.20 release so the branch tip and the npm 'latest' dist-tag are consistent again. Tags v0.16.0 through v0.17.3 are preserved as recovery anchors; the work is reachable via 'git checkout v0.17.3' if ever needed. Tree-equivalent to v0.15.20. 2026-05-16T15:55:27+00:00 Tianren Dong tianrendong.dtr@gmail.com 2026-05-16T15:55:27+00:00 urn:sha1:ad78b41140f9040094295a28c5ab6482483efa4f Major security hardening of the Chrome bridge driven by red-team findings. - Mandatory pairing via /chrome onboard (one-time per machine). Bridge pins exact chrome-extension:// origin and derives HMAC keys via HKDF. Until paired, the bridge returns idle responses and refuses to deliver commands. - Signed envelopes on /next, /result, /command. HMAC-SHA256 over protocol version, direction, method, path, extension ID, bridge ID, timestamp, fresh nonce, and SHA-256 of the body. +/-30s clock window; 5-min LRU nonce replay defense on both request and response directions; constant-time MAC compare. - Peer Pi sessions sharing the bridge sign each /command with a broker HKDF key (no bearer token transmitted) and verify the owner's signed response. - Global loopback enforcement. PI_CHROME_BRIDGE_HOST=0.0.0.0 ignored unless PI_CHROME_BRIDGE_DANGEROUS_REMOTE=1; loopback check still applies per-endpoint. - Cross-process state coherence: fs.watch + per-request mtime check on ~/.config/pi/chrome-bridge.json. A peer Pi's unpair (or any external rm/edit) propagates to the owner's in-memory state before the next privileged verify; replay caches reset on key rotation. - Body cap 1 MiB -> 413. Queue/pending/waiter caps. Malformed JSON -> 400. Non-object JSON bodies -> 400 instead of being trusted. - page.navigate initScript: try/finally around tabs.update, per-call onCommitted listener with bounded commit-wait window, one-shot delete in global onCommitted. No more stale init scripts firing on later unrelated navigations. - crypto.randomUUID() command IDs. - Manifest diet (dropped activeTab); added popup.html/popup.js for the pair UI. UX: - /chrome onboard runs install + pair in one interactive flow. - /chrome help reorganized into First-time / Day-to-day / Maintenance. - Status bar lights up as green dot only when authorized. - Early console/network capture at document_start so boot-time React errors and initial API calls aren't dropped (ported from DaniBedz/pi-chrome fork). Docs: - SECURITY.md threat model rewritten with in-scope / out-of-scope sections. - README rewritten with the install-then-pair flow front and center. - CHANGELOG 0.16.0 entry with full patch list. 2026-05-13T11:51:17+00:00 Tianren Dong tianrendong.dtr@gmail.com 2026-05-13T11:51:17+00:00 urn:sha1:e88e8a3a7a2258c5e7152da192effd8c788ae677 - Primer teaches agents the trusted:true escape hatch for CSP-locked pages (github.com, banks, many SaaS) where chrome_evaluate/chrome_snapshot throw EvalError due to missing 'unsafe-eval'. Agents now self-escalate instead of giving up and asking the user. - Corrects stale primer claim that chrome_evaluate works without 'unsafe-eval'. - scripts/sync-manifest-version.js wired to npm version + prepublishOnly lifecycle hooks; kills the recurring browser-extension manifest version drift (cf. 0.14.4, 0.14.8).