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A clean tsc does not prove the absence of casts. This scans src/ for
as any, ts-ignore, non-null assertions, inline object casts, and double
casts, wired into a new npm run check that CI runs as a single step.
The escape hatch is an external allowlist module rather than an inline
comment marker: comments are not used in this codebase, and an entry
carries a count, so adding a new cast to an already-exempted file still
fails until someone raises a number that shows up in the diff. Exactly
one exemption is needed today, for the dynamic sharp import.
scripts/ was gitignored wholesale, so the two new files are un-ignored
individually and everything else dropped there stays ignored.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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* feat: pin the agent to a chosen browser profile (#15)
Harness tabs were created with a bare Target.createTarget, which places
them in Chrome's defaultBrowserContextId — and that value follows window
focus. Which profile the agent acted as therefore depended on which
browser window the user last clicked, so the same task could run as a
work account on one run and a personal account on the next.
/browser-profile lists the connected browser's profiles as "Name (email)"
and pins one to ~/.pi/agent/browser-harness.json, so the choice outlives
the session. The same picker appears on first browser_setup when nothing
is pinned; with no interactive UI, or on cancel, setup continues with a
note and the previous behavior.
Chrome offers no direct route to another profile: Target.createTarget
rejects a foreign browserContextId, and openerId does not inherit the
opener's context. The window is opened through the browser's own command
line (--profile-directory, handed to the running browser by Chromium's
ProcessSingleton) and identified by a unique file:// sentinel page, since
a bare about:blank#token argument is discarded. Further tabs come from
window.open evaluated with userGesture: true — the only CDP-reachable way
to place a tab in a non-default browser context — correlated by a unique
token so concurrent isolated tabs stay distinct. A failed handshake is
reported, never silently redirected to another profile.
All four tab-creation sites now funnel through cdp/target-factory, so
open_urls and the isolated tabs behind web_search / read_page cannot run
with a different profile's cookies than the visible tabs.
Also fixed along the way: snap Chromium is discovered, Windows uses
%LOCALAPPDATA%, browsers launched with an explicit --user-data-dir are
found, the running browser is chosen by ranking candidates against the
connected user-data-dir rather than taking the first process found, and
an installed-but-closed browser no longer reads as running.
CI runs the profile suites and a real-browser end-to-end test on ubuntu,
macOS, and Windows — profile discovery is the one part of the harness
whose behavior genuinely differs per OS.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: single-flight harness window creation
Isolated tabs run concurrently (browser_read_page is registered
unserialized), so several could each find "no harness window" and create
one — two blank windows before this feature, two LAUNCHED profile windows
after it. ensureHarnessWindow now shares one in-flight creation per
client.
Sharing introduces a second hazard: freshlyCreated is a claim on the seed
tab, and if every waiter received it, they would all drive the same tab.
Only the caller that started the creation keeps the claim; the rest open
their own tab beside it.
Covered by test/manual/profile-concurrency-test.ts (five concurrent
isolated tabs, pinned and unpinned: distinct targets, one window, correct
profile), wired into CI on Linux only — the coordination is pure JS and
identical across platforms.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: tilde expansion differs by purpose on Windows
CI on windows-latest caught this: join("~", "x") yields "~\x" there, and
expandTilde only handled "~/".
The two uses are not the same, so they no longer share a helper. The
agent dir stays byte-compatible with pi's own expandTildePath ("~/" only,
every platform) — being more lenient would put the pin file somewhere pi
never looks. $CHROME_USER_DATA_DIR is ours to interpret, so it accepts
"~\" as well, which is what a Windows user would type.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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