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<title>sz-chrome-remote-cdp.git/src/profile/launch.ts, branch master</title>
<subtitle>pi-browser-harness, patched to drive a Chrome on another host over CDP, with castle_cdp_search web search
</subtitle>
<id>https://git.soarez.net/sz/sz-chrome-remote-cdp.git/atom?h=master</id>
<link rel='self' href='https://git.soarez.net/sz/sz-chrome-remote-cdp.git/atom?h=master'/>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.soarez.net/sz/sz-chrome-remote-cdp.git/'/>
<updated>2026-08-02T13:42:46+00:00</updated>
<entry>
<title>refactor(profile): strip comment noise</title>
<updated>2026-08-02T13:42:46+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>amankumarsingh77</name>
<email>amankumarsingh7702@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-07-28T14:59:29+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.soarez.net/sz/sz-chrome-remote-cdp.git/commit/?id=a6ec1d0915106b127affbd6b5fcc9efec48ef712'/>
<id>urn:sha1:a6ec1d0915106b127affbd6b5fcc9efec48ef712</id>
<content type='text'>
Removes module banners and comments restating the code. Keeps one-line
notes for the ProcessSingleton user-data-dir rule, the sentinel-URL and
async-spawn-error quirks, the replicated getAgentDir, pi's tilde-expansion
mirroring, the Windows wmic removal, the macOS/Linux process-identification
quirks, the picker's undefined-means-cancel contract, and the deliberately
unpersisted browserContextId.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) &lt;noreply@anthropic.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>fix(profile): resolve replaced binaries and surface real launch failures</title>
<updated>2026-07-26T15:21:43+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>amankumarsingh77</name>
<email>amankumarsingh7702@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-07-26T15:21:43+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.soarez.net/sz/sz-chrome-remote-cdp.git/commit/?id=7d2256e584709e4b7c27ab83b61950f00def7046'/>
<id>urn:sha1:7d2256e584709e4b7c27ab83b61950f00def7046</id>
<content type='text'>
Two failures made a profile launch report the wrong cause.

Linux appends " (deleted)" to /proc/&lt;pid&gt;/exe once the running binary is
unlinked, which is what a google-chrome package upgrade does while the
browser stays open. detectRunningBrowser passed that literal string on as
the executable path, so every launch tried to spawn
"/opt/google/chrome/chrome (deleted)" and hit ENOENT. Executable paths are
now validated against disk, with the marker stripped and argv[0] used as a
fallback; a binary genuinely named "… (deleted)" still wins.

spawn() reports a missing or non-executable binary asynchronously via an
'error' event rather than throwing, and that event was discarded — so
openProfileWindow returned success, no window opened, and the caller
blamed the browser 15s later with a sentinel timeout. The launch now
awaits 'spawn'/'error', returns the real cause, and removes its handshake
page on the failure path.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) &lt;noreply@anthropic.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>fix: kill leaked Chrome processes on profile seed failure</title>
<updated>2026-07-25T19:03:44+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>amankumarsingh77</name>
<email>amankumarsingh7702@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-07-25T19:03:44+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.soarez.net/sz/sz-chrome-remote-cdp.git/commit/?id=693b5e86268421b5c6e3400d988efdcc25f2e34e'/>
<id>urn:sha1:693b5e86268421b5c6e3400d988efdcc25f2e34e</id>
<content type='text'>
When a profile is pinned and ProcessSingleton fails to delegate, the
spawned Chrome process starts a full second browser instance. The
sentinel never appeared, but the spawned process was never killed
(detached + unref'd + reference discarded), accumulating zombie
browsers that consume RAM.

Three changes:
- Store child process ref and expose kill() on ProfileWindowHandle.
  Call kill() when the sentinel doesn't appear within the timeout.
- Only clear profileContextId when the browser UUID changes (Chrome
  mints a fresh UUID on every launch), avoiding unnecessary re-spawns.
- Don't clear profileContextId in setProfilePin when the pin hasn't
  changed, preventing gratuitous re-spawns on session_start.
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>feat: pin the agent to a chosen browser profile (#16)</title>
<updated>2026-07-24T18:53:05+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Aman Kumar</name>
<email>145339995+amankumarsingh77@users.noreply.github.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-07-24T18:53:05+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.soarez.net/sz/sz-chrome-remote-cdp.git/commit/?id=6dd79f7c3bafacba54acb2840f8655fcb05318bf'/>
<id>urn:sha1:6dd79f7c3bafacba54acb2840f8655fcb05318bf</id>
<content type='text'>
* feat: pin the agent to a chosen browser profile (#15)

Harness tabs were created with a bare Target.createTarget, which places
them in Chrome's defaultBrowserContextId — and that value follows window
focus. Which profile the agent acted as therefore depended on which
browser window the user last clicked, so the same task could run as a
work account on one run and a personal account on the next.

/browser-profile lists the connected browser's profiles as "Name (email)"
and pins one to ~/.pi/agent/browser-harness.json, so the choice outlives
the session. The same picker appears on first browser_setup when nothing
is pinned; with no interactive UI, or on cancel, setup continues with a
note and the previous behavior.

Chrome offers no direct route to another profile: Target.createTarget
rejects a foreign browserContextId, and openerId does not inherit the
opener's context. The window is opened through the browser's own command
line (--profile-directory, handed to the running browser by Chromium's
ProcessSingleton) and identified by a unique file:// sentinel page, since
a bare about:blank#token argument is discarded. Further tabs come from
window.open evaluated with userGesture: true — the only CDP-reachable way
to place a tab in a non-default browser context — correlated by a unique
token so concurrent isolated tabs stay distinct. A failed handshake is
reported, never silently redirected to another profile.

All four tab-creation sites now funnel through cdp/target-factory, so
open_urls and the isolated tabs behind web_search / read_page cannot run
with a different profile's cookies than the visible tabs.

Also fixed along the way: snap Chromium is discovered, Windows uses
%LOCALAPPDATA%, browsers launched with an explicit --user-data-dir are
found, the running browser is chosen by ranking candidates against the
connected user-data-dir rather than taking the first process found, and
an installed-but-closed browser no longer reads as running.

CI runs the profile suites and a real-browser end-to-end test on ubuntu,
macOS, and Windows — profile discovery is the one part of the harness
whose behavior genuinely differs per OS.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) &lt;noreply@anthropic.com&gt;

* fix: single-flight harness window creation

Isolated tabs run concurrently (browser_read_page is registered
unserialized), so several could each find "no harness window" and create
one — two blank windows before this feature, two LAUNCHED profile windows
after it. ensureHarnessWindow now shares one in-flight creation per
client.

Sharing introduces a second hazard: freshlyCreated is a claim on the seed
tab, and if every waiter received it, they would all drive the same tab.
Only the caller that started the creation keeps the claim; the rest open
their own tab beside it.

Covered by test/manual/profile-concurrency-test.ts (five concurrent
isolated tabs, pinned and unpinned: distinct targets, one window, correct
profile), wired into CI on Linux only — the coordination is pure JS and
identical across platforms.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) &lt;noreply@anthropic.com&gt;

* fix: tilde expansion differs by purpose on Windows

CI on windows-latest caught this: join("~", "x") yields "~\x" there, and
expandTilde only handled "~/".

The two uses are not the same, so they no longer share a helper. The
agent dir stays byte-compatible with pi's own expandTildePath ("~/" only,
every platform) — being more lenient would put the pin file somewhere pi
never looks. $CHROME_USER_DATA_DIR is ours to interpret, so it accepts
"~\" as well, which is what a Windows user would type.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) &lt;noreply@anthropic.com&gt;

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) &lt;noreply@anthropic.com&gt;</content>
</entry>
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