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2026-09-27macos: hot corners and tap to click, and a way to find the next keyIgor Soarez
Three settings this account has always set by hand on every new Mac, now in the script that exists for exactly that: the bottom-right hot corner sleeping the display, tap to click, and three-finger drag on an external trackpad -- the last a gap, since the script set it only for the built-in one. Each of those is written in more than one place because macOS keeps them in more than one place: an external Magic Trackpad has its own domain, and the login window reads com.apple.mouse.tapBehavior rather than either of them, per-host for this machine and globally for any other. Setting one and not the others is why tap to click sometimes survives a reboot and sometimes does not. bin/macos-defaults-diff is the general answer: snapshot, change one setting, and it prints what moved, including the -currentHost domains a plain `defaults read` never shows. It flushes cfprefsd first, since a change made seconds earlier can otherwise be missing from the read meant to reveal it, and it says plainly when nothing changed -- anything behind Privacy & Security lives in the SIP-protected TCC database and cannot be scripted at all.
2026-09-25dot-request: file a change request from a machine that cannot pushIgor Soarez
A clone made over https cannot publish anything, so a fix found on such a machine is lost at the next pull. The instructions already said to hand back a change request instead of editing; this is the command that does it. The request is markdown on stdin, signed with a key that machine holds, and posted to the inbox, which stores it only if the signature is from a key authorised there. Where the key is not authorised, nothing is stored and the submission says so. The endpoint is named here, which the leak rule would otherwise forbid, and the rule now carries the exception: a public endpoint this repo's own tooling must reach, already published by a DNS record and a certificate in the transparency logs, is not a leak. Concealing it would protect nothing and cost every machine a hand-written config file; what protects it is the signature. The private layer's check has the same exception, so it is enforced rather than remembered, and it does not extend to hosts, addresses or internal-only names. The other side is documented too: where `sz-requests` exists, what arrived can be read and judged. A signature says which machine produced the text, never that the text is right -- the machines filing these are the ones this account does not fully control.
2026-09-17dotfilesIgor Soarez
Shell, editor and terminal configuration, the tools that go with them, and szecret, an age-based secret manager whose store lives elsewhere. History restarts here. What came before was not written to be read by anyone else, and carried machine names, addresses and an encrypted secret store; it is kept privately instead. What is left is meant to be safe on any machine, including one whose owner is not me: see CLAUDE.md for the rule it is written to.